Automation and Aging in General Equilibrium:
AI Capital, Fertility, and the Return to Capital
Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility, in which firms accumulate both physical and artificial intelligence (AI) capital, and uses it to study the macroeconomic transmission of two structural disturbances: an AI technology shock and a longevity shock. The AI shock acts as a capital-demand disturbance: it raises all rates of return, most sharply the return to AI capital, reallocates investment from physical to AI capital, and produces a front-loaded output expansion that decays monotonically. The longevity shock acts as a saving-supply disturbance: it deepens the aggregate capital stock, compresses returns and the real interest rate, and generates hump-shaped, persistent dynamics. The two shocks move fertility in opposite directions: AI raises it modestly through an income effect, while longevity lowers it by strengthening the life-cycle saving motive and the cost of child-rearing. A forecast-error variance decomposition attributes most aggregate volatility to the longevity shock, while the AI shock dominates the variance of the return to AI capital. Fertility is strongly countercyclical and almost perfectly negatively correlated with hours worked, placing household time allocation at the center of the mechanism. Robustness checks across the capital share, the shock persistence, and the utility specification show that only an empirically implausible labor–AI elasticity reverses the wage and fertility signs. A welfare analysis finds the AI shock welfare-improving under complementarity, whereas longevity produces a short-run welfare loss that recedes as capital deepening raises wages, since households initially compress consumption and fertility to finance a longer retirement.
Keywords: Artificial intelligence; endogenous fertility; longevity; general equilibrium; life-cycle model; capital accumulation; demographic transition.
JEL classification: O33, J13, J11, E22, E32, O41, J26.
1. Introduction
The United States exemplifies two persistent structural transformations now reshaping advanced economies: population aging and rapid automation driven by artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. The share of Americans aged 65 and over rose to about in 2022 and is projected to reach roughly by 2050, with the older population expanding from about 58 to 82 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2023). Over the same period the U.S. total fertility rate has fallen well below the replacement level of , from about children per woman at the 1960 baby-boom peak to a record-low in 2023 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2024). Automation has diffused in parallel, and at unprecedented speed. Industrial-robot adoption has measurably reshaped U.S. local labor markets (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020); U.S. private investment in AI reached about $286 billion in 2025, and generative AI attained majority adoption within three years of release, diffusing faster than personal computers or the internet (Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, 2026). A rapidly rising share of U.S. firms now report using AI in production (U.S. Census Bureau, 2025), and field studies document sizable worker-level productivity gains (Brynjolfsson et al., 2025). These trends coincide with slowing labor-force growth, rising old-age dependency, a secular decline in the labor share (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), and sustained capital deepening.
A growing literature links demographic structure to automation. At the local and sectoral level, robot adoption has sizable effects on employment, wages, and the allocation of tasks (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020; Graetz and Michaels, 2018). Aging economies, in turn, face stronger incentives to automate, as labor scarcity and rising dependency ratios raise the relative cost of labor (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022; Prettner and Bloom, 2020; Basso and Jimeno, 2021); consistent with this mechanism, the countries with the highest old-age dependency ratios also exhibit the highest robot densities per worker (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022). Together, these findings indicate that demographic change is a first-order determinant of technology adoption and capital–labor substitution. Yet the two forces are still typically studied in isolation.
A parallel literature, organized around the task content of production, distinguishes the channels through which automation acts on labor. In the task-based framework of Autor et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b), automation exerts a displacement effect, substituting capital for labor in newly automated tasks, alongside a countervailing productivity effect that raises labor demand as automation lowers unit costs and expands output; whether the wage rises or falls depends on which effect dominates (Autor, 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Recent micro-evidence on generative AI documents sizable productivity gains for workers, concentrated among the less experienced (Brynjolfsson et al., 2025), reinforcing the view that AI is not uniformly labor-replacing. Section 4 embeds precisely this productivity–displacement distinction in general equilibrium and shows that the two effects map one-for-one onto the two terms of the model’s closed-form wage elasticity, with their balance governed by the same labor–AI elasticity that separates the complementarity and substitution regimes.
This paper develops a life-cycle general equilibrium model that integrates endogenous fertility, longevity, and AI-intensive production within a unified framework. Households choose consumption, saving, and fertility under intertemporal optimization with uncertain survival into retirement. Firms operate a production technology that treats AI capital as a factor distinct from physical capital, building on the automation-capital literature (Prettner, 2019; Lankisch et al., 2019) and the task-based framework of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b). Whereas those models specify automation capital as a near-perfect substitute for labor, we adopt a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution technology in which AI capital substitutes for labor in automatable tasks while complementing it in the aggregate, so that an improvement in AI productivity raises the marginal product of labor and the real wage. The two transformations enter the model as distinct structural disturbances, an AI technology shock and a longevity shock, whose transmission we study analytically and quantitatively through impulse response functions, a second-moment analysis, and a welfare decomposition.
Three results constitute the paper’s main contribution, and we state them at the outset. First, artificial intelligence and population aging, although unrelated in origin, act as mirror-image disturbances to a single equilibrium price: the AI shock is a capital-demand disturbance that raises the return to capital, whereas the longevity shock is a saving-supply disturbance that depresses it, so the two forces leave exactly opposite imprints on returns, the real interest rate, and fertility. Second, and most important for assessing whether these findings are robust economic mechanisms or artifacts of a particular specification, this asymmetry is a structural property of the capital market rather than of the calibration: we prove that the opposite signs of the two return responses are invariant to the preference specification, so the headline mechanism does not rest on a knife-edge assumption; only the wage and fertility responses depend on the labor–AI elasticity of substitution, and only beyond a threshold that lies well above standard empirical estimates. Third, the same demand–supply logic yields a transparent welfare ranking through a consumption-equivalent decomposition and connects the two shocks to the dynamic efficiency of the economy. To our knowledge, this is the first general equilibrium framework to derive these results jointly from endogenous fertility, longevity, and AI capital.
The two modeling choices at the heart of the framework, treating AI as a capital stock distinct from traditional capital and allowing it to complement labor in the aggregate, are disciplined by the empirical record rather than imposed for tractability. National accounts increasingly measure software, databases, and information-processing equipment as a separate and rapidly growing component of the capital stock, and the worldwide stock of industrial robots has expanded several-fold over the past decade (IFR, 2024). Direct measurement of the AI sector reinforces this view: Korinek and McKelvey (2026) estimate that, in the United States, nominal AI compute spending grew by more than per year and quality-adjusted AI output by more than per year in 2024 and 2025, an accumulation of AI capital with no parallel among conventional factors and one that motivates treating it as a distinct productive input. At the same time, the evidence that automation is uniformly labor-replacing is mixed: robot and automation adoption has raised productivity and, in many settings, has been associated with stable or rising labor demand and wages in non-automated tasks (Graetz and Michaels, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019b), consistent with an aggregate elasticity of substitution between labor and automation capital that is finite rather than near-infinite. Our nested-CES technology nests both possibilities: it collapses to the labor-replacing case when labor and AI capital are highly substitutable, and to the labor-complementing case when their elasticity of substitution falls below a transparent threshold, which the model derives analytically. Rather than presuming a single regime, the model identifies the elasticity that separates them, places the empirically relevant configuration in the complementarity region, and fully characterizes the labor-replacing regime as a limiting case (Corollary 2.1). The dependence of the wage and fertility responses on this elasticity is therefore not a fragility of the analysis but its central comparative-static object, reported transparently throughout.
The central mechanism is that both shocks transmit through the returns to capital, but from opposite sides of the market. The AI shock operates as a capital-demand disturbance: it raises all returns, most sharply the return to AI capital, reallocates investment from physical to AI capital, and lifts output on impact before it decays monotonically. The longevity shock operates as a saving-supply disturbance: by strengthening the life-cycle saving motive, it deepens the capital stock and depresses returns and the real interest rate, generating persistent, hump-shaped responses. This demand-versus-supply asymmetry is what leaves the two shocks’ opposite imprints on returns and the real interest rate.
The same asymmetry shapes fertility, which the two shocks move in opposite directions: the AI shock mildly raises it through an income effect, while the longevity shock lowers it as households reallocate time and saving away from children. A variance decomposition confirms the division of labor between the two forces: longevity accounts for the bulk of macroeconomic volatility, whereas the AI shock matters chiefly for capital pricing. Throughout, fertility is strongly countercyclical and almost perfectly negatively correlated with hours worked, placing the household time-allocation margin at the center of the transmission mechanism. A systematic robustness analysis confirms that these conclusions reflect structural properties of the model rather than fine-tuning: variation in the capital share and in the persistence of the AI shock leaves the signs of the wage, fertility, output, and consumption responses unchanged, and only the labor–AI elasticity of substitution can reverse them, beyond a threshold that lies well above standard empirical estimates.
The paper’s central contribution is to show that automation and population aging, usually studied in isolation, are most naturally understood as two opposite-signed disturbances to a single equilibrium price, the return to capital, and to trace the consequences of that asymmetry for fertility, aggregate volatility, and welfare. Three features distinguish the framework from existing work: AI capital enters as a factor distinct from physical capital in a life-cycle general equilibrium; fertility is endogenous and competes with market work for household time; and the two structural disturbances are disciplined analytically, through comparative statics and a welfare decomposition, as well as quantitatively. This places the paper at the intersection of four literatures. First, it extends macroeconomic models of demographics and growth (Diamond, 1965; Yaari, 1965; Blanchard, 1985) to incorporate endogenous fertility and automation jointly. Second, it speaks to the automation literature (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019a; Berg et al., 2018; Korinek and Stiglitz, 2019), which typically abstracts from demographic structure. Third, it connects to the emerging work on aging and automation (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022; Prettner and Bloom, 2020; Basso and Jimeno, 2021), embedding demographically induced technology adoption in a general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility. Fourth, the paper contributes a welfare characterization, deriving an exact consumption-equivalent decomposition of each disturbance and linking the two forces to the dynamic efficiency of the economy (Diamond, 1965). Throughout, we deliberately restrict attention to a closed economy: although demographic structure also shapes saving and international capital flows, this focus isolates the interaction among AI, fertility, and longevity without the confounding influence of cross-border adjustment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model economy and derives the comparative-statics results. Section 3 reports the quantitative experiments. Section 4 isolates the labor-market effects of artificial intelligence. Section 5 develops the welfare analysis. Section 6 presents the robustness exercises. Section 7 discusses the findings and their limitations. Section 8 concludes. A graphical overview of the model and the main results is provided in Supplementary Figure S1.
2. The model economy
This section presents the life-cycle general equilibrium model, which features endogenous fertility, stochastic longevity, and artificial intelligence (AI) capital. Two overlapping generations, workers and retirees, populate the economy. The working-age population grows at the gross fertility rate , while a retiree survives from one period to the next with probability , which indexes longevity. When young, households supply labor, consume, save, and choose fertility subject to a parental time cost; when old, retirees consume out of saving and the return on capital. Higher fertility thus depresses saving through the time cost of child-rearing, whereas greater longevity strengthens the retirement-saving motive and lowers fertility.
On the production side, competitive final-good firms aggregate monopolistically competitive varieties through a constant-elasticity-of-substitution technology, yielding a constant markup. Intermediate-good firms combine physical capital, labor, and AI capital in a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure governing the substitutability between labor and automation. AI capital substitutes for labor in automatable tasks but, under our baseline calibration, complements it in the aggregate, so that technological progress raises wages, consumption, and growth. Equilibrium is characterized by household optimization, firm profit maximization, market clearing, and the demographic transition.
2.1. Demographic structure
Let denote the mass of young working parents and the mass of retirees. The economy has an overlapping-generations structure with endogenous fertility and stochastic survival. Each young household of period gives rise to young households in period , so the working-age cohort obeys
| (1) |
where is the gross fertility rate of the cohort that was young in period . A young household survives into retirement with probability , so the mass of retirees is
| (2) |
The old-age dependency ratio is therefore
| (3) |
2.2. Annuity markets and accidental bequests
The model allows for an imperfect annuity market (Hansen and İmrohoroğlu, 2008; Ludwig and Vogel, 2010), with the degree of annuitization indexed by : corresponds to complete (actuarially fair) annuitization, and to the absence of annuity markets.
Let denote the savings of a young household in period , which survives into retirement in with probability . Through mortality pooling, each survivor receives, in addition to its own principal, the annuitized savings of non-survivors, so that retirement resources per survivor satisfy
| (4) |
where
| (5) |
is the annuity factor. The effective gross return on savings, , is increasing in and collapses to the actuarially fair return when .
When , the non-annuitized share of the savings of agents who do not survive is left as accidental bequests and redistributed equally among surviving retirees. Using , the bequest received by each retiree is
| (6) |
where is the gross return on savings. Bequests vanish under full annuitization () and are largest when annuity markets are absent ().
2.3. Households
The representative household is young in period and, if it survives, retired in period . It chooses worker consumption , the number of children , savings , and retirement consumption to maximize expected lifetime utility
| (7) |
where is the felicity over worker consumption and the number of children and the felicity over retirement consumption, both strictly increasing and strictly concave (, ; jointly concave, ). The parameter is the subjective discount factor and is the probability of surviving into retirement, which discounts retirement felicity because is enjoyed only in the surviving state. Firms are owned by the working-age generation, which receives dividends .
When young, the household supplies labor, devoting a fraction of its time endowment to child-rearing, so that effective hours are and effective labor income is . When old, surviving households finance consumption out of the annuitized return on their savings and the accidental bequests left by the non-survivors of their own cohort. The budget constraints are
| (8) | ||||
| (9) | ||||
| (10) |
where is the gross return on savings, is the competitive wage, and is the annuity factor. In line with the literature on the cost of children (Donni, 2015), denotes the fraction of household time allocated to child-rearing per child, generating a fertility-induced labor-supply wedge.
Because the non-annuitized savings of non-survivors are redistributed to the surviving members of the same cohort, , and the two channels recombine into the actuarially fair return . Combining the two-period budget constraints then yields the intertemporal lifetime constraint
| (11) |
Let , where denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s consolidated intertemporal budget constraint. Substituting the retirement constraint into the working-period constraint yields the present-value budget, in which the price of retirement consumption is . Define the mapping by the first-order conditions of the household problem:
| (12) |
where , , and . The household optimum is the value such that . Under logarithmic preferences, , , and .
An equilibrium is a vector that solves the first-order system , i.e. , where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s intertemporal budget constraint. Assume and that the Jacobian matrix is invertible. Then, by the Implicit Function Theorem, is an isolated regular zero of and the equilibrium is locally unique. Indeed, any equilibrium-preserving perturbation must satisfy, to first order, , that is, ; since the Jacobian is invertible, , which confirms that the equilibrium is isolated.
The implicit function theorem characterizes the household block from the single system with non-singular; the formal comparative statics (Proposition A.1, Corollary A.1, and Proposition A.2) are collected in Appendix A.1. Fertility acts as a time wedge on labor income, : a higher contracts resources and lowers saving, , whereas greater longevity strengthens the life-cycle saving motive, . Both shocks depress consumption in both phases of life (), and fertility falls with longevity, , as higher life expectancy raises the opportunity cost of child-rearing. Together, these results map demography and longevity into saving, consumption, and fertility through one coherent equilibrium mechanism.
2.4. Firms
The economy comprises perfectly competitive final-good producers and a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate-good firms indexed by , where denotes the endogenous mass of active firms. In the spirit of macroeconomic models that tie productive activity to demographic structure (Bielecki et al., 2018), we link the extensive margin of production to demographics by letting the mass of firms scale with total population . Because the level of is not separately identified from the scale of the economy, we normalize the firm-to-population ratio to one, so that and the number of active firms co-moves one-for-one with population through the entry–exit mechanism described below. Product variety is thus endogenous to demographics: population dynamics shape not only factor supplies but also the number of operating firms, and hence the range of varieties available in the economy.
2.4.1. Final-good producers
A representative final-good producer operates under perfect competition and assembles the continuum of intermediate varieties into the final good through the CES aggregator
| (13) |
where is aggregate final output, the quantity of variety , and the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The normalization neutralizes the mechanical love-of-variety effect, so that variety influences the economy through market structure rather than through a direct productivity term.
Taking the variety prices and the aggregate price index as given, the producer chooses inputs to minimize the cost of delivering . Cost minimization yields the demand system
| (14) |
and the associated aggregate price index
| (15) |
where is the relative price of variety .
2.4.2. Intermediate-good producers
There is a continuum of intermediate-good firms indexed by . In each period , firm produces output using physical capital , labor , and AI capital , according to the nested CES-Cobb-Douglas technology (Prettner, 2019; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019b; Lankisch et al., 2019):
| (16) |
where is the share of physical capital, is the productivity of AI capital, and with , , the elasticity of substitution between labor and AI capital. The inner CES aggregator is homogeneous of degree one, so the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. For (equivalently ), as in our calibration, labor and AI capital are gross substitutes within the task nest.
Firm chooses inputs to minimize cost,
| (17) |
subject to the technology constraint
| (18) |
where is the wage and , are the rental rates of physical and AI capital, respectively. Because the technology has constant returns to scale, cost minimization yields a marginal cost that is common to all firms and independent of the scale . Let denote the Lagrange multiplier on the production constraint, that is, the firm’s real marginal cost. Cost minimization yields the first-order conditions
| (19) | ||||
| (20) | ||||
| (21) |
so each factor price equals its marginal product valued at . By Euler’s theorem, constant returns imply the unit-cost representation , so that is scale-invariant and common to all firms. Facing the constant-elasticity demand , each firm prices at the constant gross markup . Under symmetry (), marginal cost is therefore given by .
2.5. Investment funds and financial-market clearing
Saving is intermediated by perfectly competitive, risk-neutral investment funds. Each period, the representative fund collects current saving , repays the gross return on past saving, and owns the two capital stocks, traditional capital and AI capital , which it rents to intermediate firms at rates and while financing investment and . Its net cash flow, rebated to households, is
| (22) |
The fund chooses to maximize the expected present value of net cash flows,
| (23) |
where, being competitive and risk neutral, the fund discounts at the gross risk-free rate. Following Christiano et al. (2005), capital accumulation is subject to investment adjustment costs,
| (24) | ||||
| (25) |
where are depreciation rates and govern the adjustment costs. The reference is the gross growth rate of investment, which on the balanced growth path equals population growth, , so that the bracketed terms equal one and adjustment costs vanish in steady state. The multipliers and on the two laws of motion are the shadow prices of installed physical and AI capital (Tobin’s ), and coincide with the asset prices reported in the impulse responses.
Writing gross investment growth as , , the first-order conditions deliver a no-arbitrage condition that equates the expected gross returns on the two assets, together with the investment Euler equations:
| (26) | ||||
| (27) | ||||
| (28) |
Financial-market clearing requires that household saving fully finance the value of the capital stock carried into the following period,
| (29) |
The zero-profit condition for the competitive funds then determines the gross return on saving , which the no-arbitrage condition equalizes across the two productive assets.
2.6. Market-clearing conditions
In equilibrium, all markets clear, firms maximize profits, and households maximize utility. Household saving is channeled entirely into investment in the two capital stocks, physical capital and AI capital, so that aggregate investment is the only vehicle for saving. By symmetry across intermediate firms, , , and for all , where the common per-firm input levels satisfy
Labor-market clearing equates aggregate labor demand to aggregate effective labor supply: each of the workers supplies units of time, so that
| (30) |
Goods-market clearing allocates output between consumption and investment. In per-worker terms, with the old-age dependency ratio , the aggregate resource constraint is
| (31) |
where aggregate consumption per worker weights retirees by their relative mass,
| (32) |
and total investment combines physical and AI investment,
| (33) |
2.7. Exogenous processes
Formally, artificial intelligence productivity and the survival probability of retirees follow stationary AR(1) processes:
| (34) | ||||
| (35) |
where and denote steady-state levels, and and are i.i.d. shocks capturing innovations in technology and longevity risk. Shocks to represent exogenous improvements in AI efficiency that raise the marginal productivity of AI capital, while shocks to capture changes in expected longevity that reshape intertemporal saving and consumption decisions. The model is used to compute impulse responses and transitional dynamics, highlighting the joint propagation of technological progress and demographic risk through general equilibrium channels.
2.8. Comparative statics
This section examines how artificial intelligence reshapes the production structure and, through general equilibrium adjustments, household decisions and long-run dynamics. AI capital enters production in a CES nest with labor that accommodates both substitutability and complementarity, so that the prevailing regime governs whether technological progress complements or displaces labor. We first characterize the firm-level substitution induced by AI capital, and then trace its general equilibrium effects on wages, fertility, saving, consumption, and growth.
Proposition 2.1 (AI and factor substitution).
Fix the firm’s output at and regard AI capital as a parameter. For given factor prices , the restricted cost-minimization problem
admits a unique interior solution , the isoquant being strictly convex, and the conditional input demands are strictly decreasing in AI capital:
At constant output, AI capital therefore substitutes for both labor and physical capital, in the sense that a larger AI stock economizes on the two other inputs.
Proof.
See Appendix A.2. ∎
Remark 2.1.
The output-constant substitutability of Proposition 2.1 should not be confused with the effect of an AI expansion on factor prices in general equilibrium. Because for all admissible parameters and whenever , a larger AI stock raises the marginal products of both physical capital and labor. Thus, although AI capital substitutes for physical capital and labor at constant output (Hicks substitute), it raises their marginal products (Edgeworth complement); in general equilibrium, a positive AI shock therefore increases the rental rate of physical capital and the real wage. Our baseline calibration, and , satisfies (equivalently, ), so the model operates in the complementarity regime; the labor-replacing case is reserved for the near-perfect-substitute limit studied in Corollary 2.1.
By substituting for traditional physical capital, AI capital triggers broader equilibrium effects that propagate through labor markets and household decisions. Proposition 2.1 and the global comparative statics of an AI expansion (Proposition A.3, formalized in Appendix A.3) together show that artificial intelligence operates through both factor reallocation and general equilibrium adjustment. At the firm level, AI substitutes for labor and traditional capital by automating production tasks. At the aggregate level, the resulting gains in productivity raise wages, saving, and lifetime consumption; because the income effect dominates, higher wages modestly raise fertility despite the increased opportunity cost of child-rearing. Artificial intelligence thus reshapes not only the structure of production but also demographic dynamics and intertemporal allocation.
The next proposition studies the case in which artificial intelligence complements labor rather than replaces it.
Proposition 2.2 (General equilibrium effects of AI under complementarity).
Assume , so that AI capital is Edgeworth-complementary to both labor and physical capital, and . Then, at a regular equilibrium, an increase in AI capital satisfies
the last inequality holding provided the investment share is interior (the induced rise in investment does not exceed the rise in output). The rental of AI capital, by contrast, is not unambiguously signed: at fixed labor it falls through diminishing returns, , while its general equilibrium response is of ambiguous sign.
Proof.
See Appendix A.4. ∎
Under complementarity (), AI raises the marginal product of labor, so a larger AI stock stimulates labor demand, the real wage, and, unless the investment response is too strong, aggregate consumption, yielding positive spillovers on welfare and macroeconomic performance. These implications reverse sharply when labor and AI become highly substitutable (), the case to which we now turn.
Corollary 2.1 (AI effects under (near-)perfect substitutability).
Let and take (), so that labor and AI capital become perfect substitutes and the inner aggregate tends to . Holding the effective-labor aggregate constant (equivalently, and fixed), one efficiency unit of AI capital displaces units of labor, , and the equilibrium responses to AI accumulation are
reversing the labor-demand and wage responses of Proposition 2.2. Since , the rental of AI capital is tied to the wage, , so shares the sign of and both fall as AI accumulates. Artificial intelligence is thus labor-replacing.
Proof.
See Appendix A.5. ∎
Remark 2.2.
At exactly, the labor–AI nest is linear, so interior factor demands are determinate only along the price locus ; off this ray the firm specializes in a single factor (a corner solution). We therefore state the comparative statics as the limit , along which the displacement and the price identity hold. The limit is necessarily one-sided: since with , one has throughout, so is the upper bound of the admissible range, approached only from below as (a right limit would require , for which the technology is not well defined).
The corollary underscores the central role of the elasticity of substitution . The two regimes are separated by the threshold (equivalently ), at which changes sign: AI is labor-augmenting for (Proposition 2.2) and labor-replacing for . The baseline calibration () lies in the complementarity regime, so the labor-replacing case merely delimits the parameter space.111In that regime an AI expansion lowers the marginal product of labor, contracts labor demand, and depresses the wage; in the perfect-substitute limit the rental of AI capital, tied to the wage through , falls alongside it. The effect on consumption is ambiguous: output still (weakly) rises, but the fall in labor income works against it, so the sign of depends on the strength of the induced investment response. Throughout, technological change interacts with demographic decisions through the labor-supply adjustments induced by the time cost of children.
The time-cost channel linking fertility to effective labor supply is formalized in Lemma A.1, and a two-capital decomposition of growth in Proposition A.4; both are collected in Appendix A. The latter decomposes the growth effect of AI into a positive productivity channel and two offsetting channels, consumption crowding-out and capital dilution; the net effect is positive precisely when next-period capital is more AI-elastic than current capital. Under complementarity and a sufficiently strong productivity response this condition holds and AI raises long-run growth, whereas otherwise the offsetting channels dominate. More broadly, the section shows that artificial intelligence jointly reshapes production, labor-market outcomes, demographic behavior, and growth, underscoring the tight interaction between technological change, household decisions, and macroeconomic development.
2.9. Calibration and functional forms
We adopt logarithmic functions,
| (36) |
| (37) |
which deliver interior solutions, unit intertemporal elasticity, and a multiplicative valuation of fertility, as is standard in macro-demographic models.
3. Quantitative experiments
This section characterizes the macroeconomic transmission of the model’s two structural forces, artificial intelligence productivity and longevity risk, tracing their equilibrium effects on the transitional dynamics of output, factor prices, saving, consumption, and demographic outcomes. The analysis proceeds in three steps. Section 3.1 presents the baseline calibration. Section 3.2 studies each shock through its impulse response functions. Section 3.3 summarizes the model’s second-order properties, isolating the relative contribution of each shock to aggregate volatility.
3.1. Calibration
The calibration (Table 3.1) combines conventional macroeconomic values with one steady-state target. On the technology side, the physical-capital share is and the labor–AI substitution parameter is , i.e., ; since (equivalently ), the baseline lies in the complementarity regime in which AI raises the marginal product of labor. Although direct estimates of the labor–AI elasticity are scarce, the broader literature on capital–labor substitution provides a guide, and it places the relevant elasticity well below the reversal threshold : survey evidence centers on – (Chirinko, 2008), micro-aggregated estimates on – (Oberfield and Raval, 2021), and even the gross-substitute estimates invoked to explain the falling labor share reach only about (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The baseline is therefore a deliberately conservative choice, set above the bulk of these estimates yet still safely within the complementarity regime; at the empirically more likely lower values, complementarity is only reinforced. AI productivity is normalized to , depreciation rates are and (faster obsolescence of AI capital), and investment adjustment costs are and . The elasticity of substitution across varieties is , implying a gross markup . On preferences, the discount factor is . On demographics, the retiree survival probability is , and the time cost per child is set to so that steady-state fertility equals ; together these imply an old-age dependency ratio . The AI and longevity shocks are persistent, with and .
| Parameter | Value | Economic interpretation |
| 0.33 | Share of physical capital in production | |
| 0.96 | Household discount factor | |
| 0.50 | CES substitution parameter between labor and AI capital | |
| 1.20 | Steady-state productivity level of AI capital | |
| 0.85 | Persistence of the AI productivity shock | |
| 3.00 | AI-capital adjustment-cost parameter | |
| 2.50 | Physical-capital adjustment-cost parameter | |
| 0.93 | Survival probability of retirees (long-run) | |
| 0.90 | Persistence of the longevity shock | |
| 0.08 | Depreciation rate of physical capital | |
| 0.12 | Depreciation rate of AI capital | |
| 0.1949 | Time cost per child (calibrated so that ) | |
| 2.00 | Steady-state fertility (children per household) | |
| 0.465 | Steady-state old-age dependency ratio | |
| 10 | Substitution elasticity, intermediate goods |
Table 3.1 presents the baseline calibration. The parameters are divided into two categories. The first category comprises conventional values from the macroeconomic literature: the capital share , the household discount factor , the physical-capital depreciation rate , and the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods , implying a steady-state markup of approximately eleven percent.
AI capital exhibits a higher depreciation rate than physical capital (), reflecting the accelerated obsolescence of the equipment and software in which it is embodied. The persistence parameters for the two driving processes, and , and the adjustment-cost parameters and , govern the speed at which the economy absorbs each disturbance.
The second category is calibrated to ensure that the deterministic steady state reproduces a limited number of demographic and technological targets. The time cost per child, , is calibrated to deliver a steady-state fertility rate of children per household; given the long-run survival probability of retirees , this yields an old-age dependency ratio . The steady-state productivity of AI capital is normalized to , and the elasticity of substitution between labor and AI capital is governed by the CES parameter .
3.2. Transitional dynamics
We analyze each shock through its impulse response functions, reported in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. To keep responses of very different magnitude visible, the two disturbances are shown on a dual vertical axis: the left-hand scale (solid blue line, circular markers) corresponds to the AI technology shock , and the right-hand scale (dashed vermillion line, square markers) to the longevity shock . All variables are expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state over a horizon of twenty periods following the shock. Figure 3.1 collects the responses of the main aggregates, while Figure 3.2 reports factor prices and demographic variables. Table 3.2 previews the qualitative predictions that the impulse responses confirm: the two shocks share the same sign on quantities but carry opposite signs on the returns to capital and on fertility, which is the exact imprint of the demand-versus-supply asymmetry.
| Variable | AI shock | Longevity shock | Dominant channel |
| Output | front-loaded (demand) vs. hump-shaped (supply) | ||
| Real wage | AI raises the marginal product of labor; longevity deepens capital | ||
| AI capital | investment reallocation vs. capital deepening | ||
| Return to AI capital | capital demand vs. saving supply | ||
| Return to physical capital | capital demand vs. saving supply | ||
| Real interest rate | capital demand vs. saving supply | ||
| Fertility | income effect vs. life-cycle saving and child-rearing cost | ||
| Hours worked | mirror of fertility under a fixed time endowment | ||
| Old-age dependency | higher survival and lower fertility compound |
3.2.1. The AI productivity shock
A positive AI productivity shock increases the marginal productivity of AI capital. As shown in Figure 3.2, the shock immediately increases the return on AI capital (approximately ), which exceeds the return on physical capital. Households therefore reallocate their savings toward AI capital, consistent with the portfolio no-arbitrage condition between the two assets. This reallocation raises AI investment and the AI capital stock, while physical investment and physical capital decline. Because aggregate saving is fixed in the short run, the expansion of AI capital crowds out physical capital. The resulting response is a reallocation across asset classes rather than a uniform expansion of the capital stock. As physical capital contracts, diminishing returns raise the marginal product of the remaining stock; the complementarity between AI capital and physical capital in production reinforces this effect, since a larger AI capital stock and more productive labor both raise the marginal product of physical capital. Relative prices move accordingly. The price of AI capital rises (approximately ) while the price of physical capital declines slightly (approximately ), a manifestation of Tobin’s , whereby investment flows toward the capital good valued above its replacement cost.
In the labor market, the higher productivity of AI capital shifts labor demand outward and raises the real wage (approximately ). By raising productivity and expanding the stock of AI capital that complements labor, the shock increases both labor demand and wages. At the same time, the associated wealth effect, as households become wealthier, reduces labor supply, so that wages rise even as hours worked fall. The responses of the main aggregates to both shocks are reported in Figure 3.1.
The combination of higher wages and lower hours reflects a contraction in labor supply along an outward-shifting demand curve, rather than a decline in labor demand. Internal consistency requires that AI capital complement labor; were AI a strong substitute, the marginal product of labor and the wage could instead decline.
Labor supply responds to two opposing forces. The substitution effect, in which a higher wage increases the reward to working, pushes hours up, while the income effect, greater wealth increases the demand for leisure, pushes them down. The slight net reduction in hours worked indicates that the income effect dominates in the short run. The higher return on capital also raises the real interest rate (approximately ). Through the Euler equation, this tilts the consumption profile toward the future; in levels, however, the wealth effect dominates and aggregate consumption rises, driven primarily by retirees, who hold a larger share of wealth.
The higher wage increases the opportunity cost of parental time, a substitution effect that would, in isolation, reduce fertility. The offsetting income effect leaves fertility only marginally higher. The AI shock thus exerts large effects in the productive and financial blocks but only minimal short-run demographic effects, as the factor-price and demographic responses in Figure 3.2 make clear. Finally, as AI capital accumulates, its marginal productivity and its return premium over physical capital erode, the physical capital stock recovers, and output, which rises on impact by approximately , declines steadily as the productivity impulse dissipates.
3.2.2. The longevity shock
The longevity shock generates the opposite pattern across Figures 3.1 and 3.2. A rise in life expectancy strengthens the motive for retirement saving: workers cut current consumption by approximately to save more. The resulting increase in the supply of loanable funds works in exactly the opposite direction from the AI shock, which operated on the demand side.
Higher savings raise the accumulation of both physical and AI capital, and hence investment in each. Because capital accumulates only gradually, output rises slowly and peaks at approximately in the fourth or fifth period (Figure 3.1), a more sluggish profile than under the AI shock. As the capital stock expands while technology is held fixed, the return on capital falls: the real interest rate declines by about , and the returns on physical and AI capital turn negative (approximately and , respectively). This outcome is indicative of a savings glut. The price of capital rises on impact, and the larger capital stock raises labor productivity, generating a hump-shaped increase in the real wage of about .
The old-age dependency ratio exhibits the largest response in the system (Figure 3.2). Since , it is governed by the survival rate of retirees () and the fertility rate (), and both margins move in the same direction here. First, higher survival rates enlarge the elderly population. Second, fertility declines by approximately as households, anticipating longer lifespans, prioritize their own future consumption and reduce investment in child-rearing; lower interest rates and a longer retirement horizon further tilt the allocation away from children and toward saving. Households accordingly work more hours to accumulate retirement wealth, while retirees, more numerous and longer-lived, raise their consumption.
3.3. Business cycle properties
The model is driven by two structural shocks, each calibrated to a standard deviation of and uncorrelated with the other: an AI technology shock () and a longevity shock (). We summarize its second-order properties through theoretical moments and persistence, the unconditional variance decomposition, and contemporaneous cross-correlations; the supporting tables are provided in the Appendix (Tables C.1–C.3).
Volatility is concentrated in prices and demographic ratios rather than in real quantities: the real interest rate (), the dependency ratio (), the capital returns () and (), and fertility () are the most volatile, whereas output, consumption, capital, and investment fall between and . The accumulation variables are highly persistent ( for , , , , and ), which accounts for the slow, hump-shaped impulse responses documented above, while asset prices and workers’ consumption revert more quickly (). The variance decomposition delivers the central finding: longevity dominates, explaining ninety to one hundred percent of the variance in nearly every variable: output (), consumption (), capital (), fertility (), and the dependency ratio (); whereas the AI shock matters only for capital pricing, accounting for of the variance in , of , of , and of the real interest rate. Since the two shocks share a common standard deviation, these shares reflect the model’s transmission mechanism rather than differences in shock size. The correlation structure indicates a single dominant factor in the real block: output, consumption, capital, AI capital, investment, the wage, and saving co-move strongly ( to ), the real interest rate moves countercyclically as higher saving depresses its equilibrium value, and is only weakly tied to the real block (), being governed by the longevity-independent AI shock. Fertility is the mirror image, negatively correlated with every real aggregate and perfectly with hours worked (), a direct expression of the household’s time-allocation trade-off between market work and children. Taken together, these second-order statistics reinforce the general equilibrium intuition obtained from the impulse response analysis.
A noteworthy feature of the correlation matrix is that worker consumption, , is the only consumption variable that moves negatively with output (). This pattern is a direct signature of the saving-supply mechanism, not an anomaly. The longevity shock accounts for most of the volatility in both and (Table C.2), prompting workers to compress to finance capital deepening, thereby increasing . Thus, and move in opposite directions under the dominant shock. The same logic explains the negative comovement of with , , , , , , and prices of installed capital, and ; all move with output in response to the saving-supply channel. In addition, moves positively with fertility, , since the longevity shock depresses both. In a standard one-agent RBC model with only TFP shocks, consumption would be uniformly procyclical. Thus, the negative correlation here highlights the source of fluctuations in an OLG economy dominated by a saving-supply force. Figure 3.3 summarizes this division of labor between the two disturbances: the longevity shock accounts for nearly the entire forecast-error variance of the quantity block and of the real interest rate, while the AI shock is concentrated in the pricing of capital, where it explains the bulk of the variance of the return to AI capital.
4. Artificial intelligence and the labor market
The transmission analysis established that, in the complementarity regime, an AI expansion raises the real wage. We now isolate the labor-market footprint of artificial intelligence and show that it is governed by two distinct elasticity thresholds rather than one: a threshold for the level of the wage and a separate threshold for the labor share. Because the model’s factor demands are available in closed form, the relevant elasticities can be written explicitly and evaluated at the calibration without further simulation. Throughout this section the comparative statics are partial-equilibrium objects: they hold physical capital and hours at their equilibrium levels and trace the factor-demand response to a marginal expansion of the AI stock, thereby isolating the technological channel from the household adjustments already analyzed in Section 3.2.
4.1. Wages and the labor share
Lemma 4.1 (Factor shares and labor-market elasticities).
Let with , and write and for the AI share of the labor–AI composite and the aggregate labor share. At fixed , the elasticities of output, the wage, the AI rental, and the labor share with respect to AI capital are , , , and .
Proof.
See Appendix A.7. ∎
Proposition 4.1 (The labor-share threshold).
An AI expansion lowers the aggregate labor share if and only if labor and AI capital are gross substitutes in the task nest, ; it raises the labor share if , and leaves it unchanged in the Cobb–Douglas nest . The size of the decline, , is increasing in both the degree of substitutability and the AI income share .
Proof.
Immediate from in Lemma 4.1, since and . ∎
Proposition 4.2 (Two thresholds: the wage level versus the labor share).
The wage and the labor share respond to AI through two distinct knife-edges. The wage rises if and only if (Edgeworth complementarity, Proposition 2.2), whereas the labor share falls if and only if . Since the two thresholds are ordered, , and for every in the intermediate band
an AI expansion simultaneously raises the real wage and lowers the labor share. The baseline calibration lies inside this band ().
Proof.
The wage sign follows from , which is positive iff , i.e. ; the labor-share sign is Proposition 4.1. Ordering and the band are then immediate. ∎
Corollary 4.1 (Wage–share decoupling at the baseline).
At the baseline calibration an AI expansion raises the real wage yet lowers labor’s share of income: the wage gain is outpaced by the rise in output, so labor receives a smaller slice of a larger pie. The model therefore reconciles a positive wage response to automation with the secular decline of the labor share documented for capital- and automation-intensive economies (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018), without invoking any fall in the wage itself.
Proof.
By Lemma 4.1, while for . ∎
Remark 4.1 (A Hicksian reading, and the labor share beyond Cobb–Douglas).
Proposition 4.1 is the classical Hicksian statement that a factor’s income share rises with its own quantity if and only if the elasticity of substitution against it is below unity: AI’s share within the task nest rises with precisely when , at the expense of labor. The result extends to the general CES nest of Section 6.2. With outer elasticity and physical-capital value share , the aggregate labor share is and responds to AI according to
which collapses to in the Cobb–Douglas outer nest (, ). The labor share thus falls whenever ; since at the baseline, this holds for every outer elasticity , so the share-eroding effect of AI is more robust than the wage threshold of Proposition 6.1, which it nests as the special case .
Table 4.1 evaluates these elasticities at the baseline calibration, where the AI income share is (so that labor receives of output). The signs realize the band of Proposition 4.2: a ten-percent rise in the AI stock raises the wage by about and output by about , and in consequence lowers the labor share by about ; the rental of AI capital falls by about through diminishing returns, while AI’s own income share rises by about . Figure 4.1 traces the same elasticities across the elasticity of substitution , making the two knife-edges visible: the wage elasticity crosses zero at and the labor-share elasticity at , with the shaded band marking the empirically relevant region in which AI is wage-enhancing but share-eroding.
| Object | Elasticity | Value | Response to AI |
| Output | |||
| Real wage | |||
| Labor share | |||
| AI income share | |||
| AI rental |
The two-threshold structure clarifies what the model does and does not say about automation and labor. It does not predict that AI depresses wages at empirically plausible elasticities: the wage falls only beyond , outside the range of existing estimates. It does, however, predict that AI erodes the labor share for any , a far weaker and empirically well-supported condition. The apparent tension between “AI is good for workers” (wages rise) and “AI shifts income to capital” (the labor share falls) is thus resolved within a single technology: both hold simultaneously throughout the band that contains the calibration, because output rises faster than the wage. This decoupling is the labor-market counterpart of the capital-demand interpretation of the AI shock developed in Section 3.2.
4.2. Productivity and displacement: a structural decomposition
The wage elasticity admits an interpretation in terms of the two canonical channels of the task-based literature (Autor et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018, 2019b): a productivity effect, by which automation lowers costs, expands output, and raises labor demand, and a displacement effect, by which capital substitutes for labor in automatable tasks. In the present model these two forces are not assumed; they emerge as the two additive terms of the closed-form wage elasticity and are individually measurable.
Proposition 4.3 (Productivity effect).
An AI expansion raises average labor productivity for every value of the labor–AI elasticity:
Output per worker therefore rises with automation regardless of whether AI complements or substitutes for labor.
Proof.
Holding fixed, by Lemma 4.1; positivity follows from , . ∎
Proposition 4.4 (Productivity–displacement decomposition of the wage).
The wage response to AI is the difference between the productivity effect and a displacement effect,
| (38) |
where the productivity effect equals the rise in output per worker (Proposition 4.3) and the displacement effect equals the erosion of labor’s income share, . The wage rises if and only if the productivity effect dominates, , that is .
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 4.1, writing ; the displacement term coincides with by the same lemma. ∎
Corollary 4.2 (The productivity–pay gap).
Automation opens a gap between labor productivity, which always rises, and the real wage, which rises only under complementarity. The gap equals the displacement effect and the decline in the labor share,
At the extensive margin, the strength of displacement is governed, as everywhere in the model, by the labor–AI elasticity. In the perfect-substitute limit of Corollary 2.1 one efficiency unit of AI capital replaces units of labor and the displacement effect overwhelms the productivity effect, so the wage falls; under the baseline complementarity the displacement effect is present but dominated, so automation raises both output per worker and the wage while still shifting income toward capital. Figure 4.2 plots the two effects and their net across : they are equal at the knife-edge , where the wage response vanishes, and the productivity effect dominates throughout the empirically relevant band that contains the baseline.
| Channel | Elasticity | Value | Response to AI |
| Productivity effect | |||
| Displacement effect | |||
| Net wage effect | |||
| Productivity–pay gap | productivity wage |
This decomposition gives the model a direct empirical interpretation. The productivity effect is the structural counterpart of the documented output-per-worker gains from automation (Graetz and Michaels, 2018) and, more recently, from generative AI, where field evidence reports sizable productivity gains concentrated among less-experienced workers (Brynjolfsson et al., 2025); the displacement effect is the counterpart of the task-substitution channel emphasized by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b) and Autor (2015). The model’s contribution is to show that, within a single calibrated technology, the same elasticity that governs the sign of the wage response also fixes the relative magnitude of the two effects, so that the productivity–pay gap, the wedge between rising output per worker and a more slowly rising wage, is exactly the erosion of the labor share.
5. Welfare analysis
The positive analysis establishes that the two disturbances move returns, fertility, and output in systematically opposite ways. We now ask how they map into welfare. We adopt the household’s expected lifetime utility as the welfare criterion, derive an exact decomposition of the welfare effect of a structural shock into income, return, and longevity channels, and relate the two shocks to the dynamic efficiency of the economy.
Definition 5.1 (Cohort welfare and the consumption-equivalent measure).
The ex ante expected lifetime welfare of the cohort that is young in period , evaluated at the equilibrium allocation, is
A utilitarian planner ranks equilibria by , with cohort weights . For a perturbation that changes welfare by , the consumption-equivalent variation is the permanent proportional change in lifetime consumption, scaling both and by , that reproduces the same welfare change. Under logarithmic preferences,
since scaling both consumptions by raises by . The derivation is given in Appendix A.11.
The welfare effect of a structural shock decomposes exactly into income, return, and longevity channels, obtained from an envelope representation of marginal welfare (Lemma A.2, stated and proved in Appendix A).
Proposition 5.1 (Welfare decomposition of a structural shock).
For a structural disturbance , the total effect on cohort welfare is
Proof.
See Appendix A.13. ∎
Proposition 5.2 (Signs of the welfare effects).
Under the baseline complementarity regime : (a) the AI shock is welfare-improving, , because while (Propositions A.3–2.2); (b) the welfare effect of the longevity shock is of ambiguous sign: the value of a longer life (the term , positive provided retirement consumption exceeds the felicity’s unit reference, ) and the capital-deepening wage gain () pull welfare up, whereas the cost of financing retirement and the compression of returns () pull it down. Longevity raises cohort welfare if and only if
Proof.
See Appendix A.14. ∎
Proposition 5.3 (The two shocks and dynamic efficiency).
Along a balanced path on which aggregate capital and output grow at the gross population growth rate , the competitive equilibrium is dynamically efficient if and only if the gross return weakly exceeds that growth rate, (Diamond, 1965). The marginal effect of a structural shock on the efficiency margin decomposes as
For the AI shock both terms are nonnegative (, ), so the margin widens if and only if the return response dominates the fertility response, , which holds in the baseline calibration where the return to capital is the most responsive variable. For the longevity shock both terms are nonpositive (, ), so the net effect on the margin is ambiguous in general; the saving-supply force nonetheless compresses toward the growth rate, the channel through which population aging threatens dynamic efficiency.
Proof.
See Appendix A.15. ∎
Remark 5.1.
Because parents bear the full time cost of child-rearing, per child, the fertility margin carries no static externality in this economy: the private and social marginal costs of a child coincide. The welfare-relevant friction is therefore intertemporal and operates through Proposition 5.3: it is the saving-supply force unleashed by longevity, not the fertility decision per se, that can push the economy toward dynamic inefficiency.
The decomposition makes precise the sense in which the two structural forces are not symmetric in welfare terms. The AI shock is unambiguously welfare-improving in the complementarity regime and pushes the economy deeper into the dynamically efficient region; the longevity shock confers the first-order benefit of a longer life but, by compressing returns and deepening capital, simultaneously raises the cost of financing retirement and compresses the return toward the economy’s growth rate, so that its net welfare effect must be settled quantitatively. Figure 5.1 reports the calibrated counterpart of Definition 5.1: the consumption-equivalent welfare paths implied by each shock along its transition. In line with Proposition 5.2, the AI shock delivers a small but uniformly positive welfare gain that decays monotonically, small because AI operates chiefly through asset prices rather than through the consumption and fertility quantities that enter welfare. The longevity shock, by contrast, produces a short-run welfare loss roughly an order of magnitude larger, as households compress worker consumption and fertility to finance the longer retirement; this loss recovers gradually as the induced capital deepening raises wages. The calibrated outcome thus resolves the ambiguity of Proposition 5.2(b) on impact in favor of the cost-of-financing and return-compression channels, and the two paths are plotted on separate vertical scales because the AI effect is far smaller.
6. Robustness analysis
We assess the sensitivity of the impulse responses to a positive AI productivity shock along three structural margins: the labor–AI elasticity of substitution , the physical-capital share , and the persistence of the AI shock . The first governs the substitution–complementarity distinction that determines the sign of the wage and fertility responses; the second alters the relative weight of physical capital in production; the third varies the half-life of the technological impulse. For each exercise, we re-solve the model over a grid of values, hold all remaining parameters at their baseline, and report the impulse responses of six headline variables: the real wage, fertility, output, aggregate consumption, and the rentals of AI and physical capital. Throughout, series are identified by three redundant attributes: color (from a colorblind-safe palette), line style, and marker shape; the figures therefore remain readable under black-and-white reproduction. In the bottom-row bar charts, fills additionally carry a light-to-dark grayscale gradient and their edges retain the line colors, so that each parameter value is identifiable by both shade and edge. Because the exercise governs whether AI complements or substitutes for labor, we discuss it in detail here; the supporting exercises on and are reported in Appendix B.
6.1. The labor–AI elasticity of substitution
The qualitative response to an AI shock depends on whether labor and AI capital are Edgeworth complements or substitutes in production. The threshold separating the two regimes is ; the baseline value places the economy in the complementarity regime. We sweep , spanning the complementarity regime (), the knife-edge (), and the substitution regime (). This grid provides a direct test of the analytical claim of Corollary 2.1: as crosses , the wage and fertility responses to AI reverse sign.
Three patterns emerge from Figure 6.1. First, the wage response is positive and large for low , declines monotonically as rises, vanishes near the knife-edge , and turns negative once ; the decline is most pronounced at intermediate elasticities and then attenuates toward zero in the perfect-substitute limit, where the wage becomes insensitive to the AI shock because labor’s marginal product is pinned down by the near-linear technology. This sign reversal is precisely the prediction of Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.1: AI raises the marginal product of labor under complementarity and depresses it under substitution. Second, the fertility response tracks the same wage channel. Because the income effect that sustains fertility operates through the AI-induced wage gain, the modest baseline rise in fertility weakens monotonically as increases and becomes negligible in the perfect-substitute limit, where the AI shock no longer raises lifetime wealth on net and households cease to reallocate time and saving toward children. Fertility thus serves as a sensitive diagnostic of the prevailing regime. Third, output is positive at impact for every , since the AI shock raises the marginal product of AI capital regardless of the nest; the response path flattens as rises because the labor-side amplification through wages and labor demand weakens. The bottom row reports the peak responses of the two rental rates. The rental of AI capital jumps sharply on impact in every case, and its peak response rises in , from about at to at , as production leans more heavily on the AI factor; the peak response of the physical-capital rental moves in the opposite direction, falling steadily from about to nearly zero as the marginal product is reallocated toward AI capital when the two factors become closer substitutes for labor. The exercise confirms that the substantive results of the paper derive from the complementarity regime that the baseline calibration occupies; the labor-replacing regime is internally consistent and exhibits the sign patterns predicted by Corollary 2.1, but it lies outside the range of empirical estimates of . We stress that this elasticity dependence is a deliberate and transparent feature of the framework rather than a hidden fragility: the model nests both regimes within a single technology, locates the knife-edge analytically at , and characterizes the behavior on either side, so that a reader can map any preferred empirical value of the labor–AI elasticity directly into the model’s predictions.
The complementary exercises reported in Appendix B confirm that the signs of the wage, fertility, output, and consumption responses to a positive AI shock are robust to plausible variation in the capital share and in the persistence of the shock; only the labor–AI elasticity of substitution can reverse them, and only beyond the empirically supported range.
6.2. Robustness to the production structure
A natural concern is that the substitution–complementarity distinction is an artifact of the Cobb–Douglas outer nest, which fixes the physical-capital share at and imposes a unit elasticity between physical capital and the labor–AI composite. We address this directly by embedding the technology in a strictly more general two-level CES and showing that the complementarity threshold survives, merely relocating to a transparent function of two separately disciplinable elasticities.
Proposition 6.1 (Generality of the complementarity threshold).
Replace the Cobb–Douglas outer aggregator with a CES nest of physical capital and the labor–AI composite,
with outer elasticity between physical capital and the composite , and inner elasticity between labor and AI capital. Let be the equilibrium value share of physical capital. Then AI capital is an Edgeworth complement to labor, , so that a positive AI shock raises the marginal product of labor and the wage, if and only if
The baseline is the Cobb–Douglas limit , in which is constant and the threshold collapses to .
Proof.
See Appendix A.6. ∎
Proposition 6.1 shows that the knife-edge is governed not by the Cobb–Douglas assumption but by the ratio of the outer elasticity to the physical-capital share. Evaluated at the baseline factor share (), the boundary is : it equals for , for the Cobb–Douglas case , and for . The baseline economy () therefore remains in the complementarity regime for every outer elasticity , that is, for the Cobb–Douglas nest and for the upper part of the empirical range of the capital–labor substitution elasticity. Only when physical capital and the labor–AI composite are strong gross complements, below roughly two-thirds, does AI become labor-replacing at . The qualitative conclusions of the positive analysis thus rest on two transparent and independently estimable elasticities, and , rather than on the functional form of the outer nest.
6.3. Relation to functional forms in the AI macroeconomics literature
The nested CES nests, as special cases, the production technologies used elsewhere in the macroeconomics of automation, so the robustness of the paper’s conclusions to those alternatives can be read directly off the elasticity grid above. Three benchmark specifications recur in that literature. First, automation capital as a perfect substitute for labor: Prettner (2019) and Lankisch et al. (2019) write output as , with AI capital and labor perfectly substitutable. This is exactly the limit of our inner nest (Corollary 2.1); it places the economy in the labor-replacing regime and reverses the wage and fertility responses. Our framework reproduces this case but shows that it requires an elasticity far above existing estimates of the labor–automation elasticity. Second, task-based automation: the framework of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b) aggregates a continuum of tasks performed by capital or labor and, at the aggregate level, reduces to a CES between labor and automation capital whose elasticity is governed by the share of automated tasks, which parameterizes directly. Third, labor-augmenting AI, , in which AI raises labor productivity multiplicatively; here for every parameter value, so an AI shock raises the marginal product of labor unconditionally, strengthening rather than challenging the complementarity result. Confronting the model with these alternative forms therefore leaves the headline mechanism, the opposite-signed transmission of the AI and longevity shocks through the return to capital, intact: only the perfect-substitute specification overturns the wage and fertility signs, and it does so outside the empirically relevant range of the labor–AI elasticity.
6.4. Sensitivity to the utility functional form
The exercises above vary technology and shock parameters while holding preferences at the logarithmic benchmark , . Because the logarithmic case is a knife-edge along several margins, implying a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and a unit-elastic demand for children, we now separate the conclusions that are properties of preferences from those that are structural. We consider three departures from the benchmark: (i) constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) felicity over consumption, with , , which detaches the IES from unity; (ii) iso-elastic felicity over fertility, , which detaches the own-price elasticity of fertility demand from ; and (iii) Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman (GHH) non-separability, which removes the wealth effect on the time-allocation margin.
Two conclusions are invariant across these specifications, and one is genuinely knife-edge. First, the demand-versus-supply asymmetry that organizes the paper, namely the AI shock raising the return to capital and the longevity shock compressing it, is a property of the capital market and the production block, not of preferences. We record this formally.
Proposition 6.2 (Preference-robustness of the demand–supply asymmetry).
Consider any preferences with , strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave, for which consumption and the number of children are normal goods and the retirement-saving motive is increasing in survival, . Then, at an interior equilibrium with capital-market clearing , the gross return on saving satisfies
The preference parameters affect the magnitude of these responses but not their sign.
Proof.
See Appendix A.10. ∎
Second, the opposite-sign fertility responses to the two shocks survive for the whole class of preferences in which children are a normal good carrying a time cost: the AI shock raises fertility through the income effect of a higher wage (Proposition A.3), while the longevity shock lowers it by strengthening the life-cycle saving motive and raising the opportunity cost of child-rearing (Proposition A.2). Neither mechanism relies on the logarithmic form. Third, the one result that is specific to the benchmark is the near-perfect negative correlation between fertility and hours. By Lemma A.1, the time-cost channel vanishes exactly when fertility demand is unit-elastic (), which is the logarithmic case ; for (inelastic demand) the fertility–hours link weakens, and for (elastic demand) it strengthens. The GHH specification likewise attenuates the AI-to-fertility channel by muting the wealth effect, but leaves the longevity channel and the return asymmetry intact. We therefore read the unit fertility–hours correlation as the sharp benchmark of a more general, same-signed pattern, exactly as anticipated in the Discussion. Taken together, these exercises, spanning technology, shock persistence, and the preference specification, confirm that the paper’s main conclusions are structural properties of the model rather than artifacts of fine-tuning.
7. Discussion
The analysis brings together three strands of macroeconomic research that are typically pursued in isolation. The first is the macroeconomics of automation and artificial intelligence, concerned with how capital-augmenting and task-replacing technologies reshape factor returns and the functional distribution of income (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018; Aghion et al., 2019). The second is the economics of endogenous fertility, organized around the trade-off between the number of children and the parental time they require (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker et al., 1990), which the unified growth literature places at the center of the demographic transition (Galor and Weil, 2000). The third is the life-cycle and overlapping-generations literature on longevity, in which a longer expected lifespan strengthens the saving motive and deepens the capital stock (Bloom et al., 2003; de la Croix and Licandro, 1999; Cervellati and Sunde, 2005). By embedding all three within a single general equilibrium model with two types of capital, our framework lets technological and demographic forces interact rather than operate along separate margins; that interaction is the source of the paper’s central result.
That result turns on the return to capital. Both shocks are transmitted through the same equilibrium price, but from opposite sides of the market: the AI shock shifts the demand for capital outward, raising returns and the real interest rate, whereas the longevity shock shifts the supply of capital outward, pushing them down. This demand-versus-supply logic explains why two apparently unrelated disturbances leave opposite imprints not only on returns but also on fertility, which responds jointly to the wage, the opportunity cost of children (Becker and Lewis, 1973), and the saving motive. Seen in this light, the model delivers a unified account of two phenomena usually discussed separately: the prospect that AI sustains the return to capital (Aghion et al., 2019), and the secular decline in real interest rates associated with population aging (Eggertsson et al., 2019; Gagnon et al., 2021). Under our calibration the second force prevails, so the equilibrium interest rate falls on balance, consistent with the low- environment documented for aging economies (Gagnon et al., 2021).
Several features of the model qualify these conclusions and indicate where they are most and least robust. The sign of the fertility and wage responses to the AI shock hinges on whether AI capital complements labor in the aggregate; were the two strongly substitutable, the marginal product of labor and the wage could fall (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018), and the income effect that supports fertility would weaken or reverse. As stressed above, this dependence is not a hidden fragility but the model’s central comparative-static margin, reported transparently for both regimes. The near-perfect negative correlation between fertility and hours worked is, in turn, a direct expression of the household’s time-allocation structure, in which market work and child-rearing compete for a fixed time endowment (Becker and Lewis, 1973); richer models with home production or market childcare would attenuate this link. Finally, the variance decomposition holds the two shocks to a common standard deviation. The finding that longevity dominates aggregate volatility is therefore a statement about the model’s transmission mechanism, not evidence that longevity disturbances are empirically larger than technological ones. Disciplining the relative magnitudes and frequencies of the two shocks with data is a necessary step before drawing firm conclusions about their historical contributions.
The two shocks are also asymmetric in welfare terms. In the complementarity regime the AI shock is unambiguously welfare-improving and pushes the economy deeper into the dynamically efficient region, whereas longevity confers the first-order benefit of a longer life but, by compressing returns and deepening capital, raises the cost of financing retirement and compresses the return toward the economy’s growth rate (Diamond, 1965). In the calibrated model these opposing forces resolve, on impact, in favor of the cost-of-financing and return-compression channels: longevity produces a pronounced short-run welfare loss, an order of magnitude larger than the small, uniformly positive gain from the AI shock, as households cut worker consumption and fertility to finance the longer retirement; the loss then recedes as the induced capital deepening raises wages. This links the model to the secular-stagnation reading of population aging (Eggertsson et al., 2019; Gagnon et al., 2021) from the supply side of capital, and supplies a transparent consumption-equivalent metric (Definition 5.1) that ranks the two disturbances along the transition.
These qualifications notwithstanding, the analysis carries a clear, policy-relevant message. Because the fertility decline operates through the reallocation of household time and saving rather than through technology per se, policies that lower the time cost of children are likely to be more effective at sustaining fertility than interventions aimed at the pace of automation. More broadly, the framework implies that the macroeconomic consequences of AI and population aging cannot be assessed in isolation: their effects on capital returns partly offset one another, whereas their effects on fertility compound in the same direction, with first-order implications for the long-run trajectory of the old-age dependency ratio (Galor and Weil, 2000).
8. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the joint macroeconomic effects of artificial intelligence and rising longevity in a unified general equilibrium model with a life-cycle structure, endogenous fertility, and two forms of capital, physical and AI. The central finding is that the two forces transmit through the same equilibrium price from opposite sides of the market: the AI shock is a capital-demand disturbance that raises returns, most sharply on AI capital, reallocates investment toward that asset, and lifts output on impact, whereas the longevity shock is a saving-supply disturbance that deepens the capital stock, compresses returns and the real interest rate, and propagates through hump-shaped dynamics. The same asymmetry moves fertility in opposite directions, mildly upward under AI through an income effect and downward under longevity, so that the old-age dependency ratio is the most responsive variable in the system; fertility is robustly countercyclical and almost perfectly negatively correlated with hours, placing household time allocation at the center of the mechanism.
Quantitatively, longevity is the dominant source of fluctuations, accounting for the bulk of the variance of most aggregates, while AI operates chiefly as an asset-return shock concentrated on the price of capital, particularly the return to AI capital. These conclusions are structural rather than calibrated: across the capital share, the shock persistence, the utility specification, and a generalized CES production nest, only an empirically implausible labor–AI elasticity, beyond the threshold (equal to in the baseline), can reverse the wage and fertility signs. A welfare analysis sharpens the asymmetry: under complementarity the AI shock yields a small, uniformly positive welfare gain and moves the economy deeper into the dynamically efficient region, whereas the longevity shock trades the value of a longer life against costlier retirement financing and compressed returns, pushing toward the growth rate . In the calibrated model the latter forces dominate on impact, so longevity generates a short-run welfare loss, an order of magnitude larger than the AI gain, that recovers only gradually as capital deepening raises wages.
The policy implication is direct: because the fertility decline operates through the reallocation of household time and saving rather than through technology itself, policies that lower the time cost of children are likely to be more effective at sustaining fertility than interventions aimed at the pace of automation. Introducing skill heterogeneity, labor-market frictions, and a richer treatment of AI–labor complementarity, and disciplining the relative size and frequency of the two shocks with data, are natural next steps before assessing their historical contributions.
Declaration of competing interest
The author declares no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to seminar and conference participants for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are the author’s own.
Data availability
This study is theoretical and computational and does not use external empirical datasets. The replication code that generates the model solution, impulse responses, variance decompositions, and robustness exercises is available from the author upon reasonable request and will be deposited in a public repository upon acceptance.
Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the manuscript preparation process
During the preparation of this work, the author used Claude (Anthropic), an AI-assisted writing tool, for language editing, reference formatting, and improving the clarity and structure of the exposition. The author reviewed and edited the output as needed and takes full responsibility for the content of the published article.
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Appendix A Proofs and additional comparative-statics results
A.1. Saving, consumption, and fertility in the household block
Proposition A.1.
Let , where the equilibrium vector is implicitly defined by , with and . Assume the Jacobian-based monotonicity conditions
where . Then and .
Proof.
Let be implicitly defined by , where and is invertible. By the Implicit Function Theorem, there exists a mapping in a neighborhood of such that
Define . Since , we have
Substituting the expressions for and yields
The assumed sign restrictions
imply the stated comparative statics. ∎
Corollary A.1.
Proof.
Let with equilibrium defined by , where and is invertible. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
Let and . Then
By Proposition A.1, both projected directions are strictly positive, hence for and , which implies the result. ∎
Proposition A.2.
Let be of class , and let be a point satisfying , where and denotes the exogenous longevity parameter. Suppose the partial Jacobian is invertible. Then there exist open neighborhoods and and a unique map of class such that for all . In particular, the equilibrium fertility , with , is a well-defined function with
If, moreover, , then , i.e. higher longevity lowers equilibrium fertility.
Proof.
By hypothesis, and the partial Jacobian is invertible at the point satisfying . By the Implicit Function Theorem, there exists a neighborhood and a unique map of class such that
Differentiating this identity with respect to and evaluating at gives
and, since is invertible,
Let , so that the equilibrium fertility component is . Projecting the previous identity onto yields
By the maintained sign condition , the right-hand side is strictly negative; hence
that is, greater longevity lowers equilibrium fertility. ∎
Remark A.1 (Closed-form verification of the longevity sign conditions).
Under the baseline logarithmic preferences the household block admits the closed forms
where is full income and the time-cost identity reconciles with the budget constraint . Differentiating at fixed prices verifies the sign conditions invoked above directly, without recourse to the Jacobian restriction:
Greater longevity therefore raises retirement saving while lowering both current consumption and equilibrium fertility, confirming Proposition A.2 and the components of Proposition A.1 and Corollary A.1 in closed form.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof.
Fix output at , treat as a parameter, and minimize subject to , where and . Since is strictly quasi-concave in for , , the isoquant is strictly convex and the solution is unique. The tangency condition together with the constraint yields, after eliminating ,
| (A.1) |
Let and () be the labor and AI shares in the composite, so that . Differentiating (A.1) gives
where both signs use , and . Hence . Finally, the constraint gives , so , i.e., . ∎
A.3. Global comparative statics of AI
Proposition A.3 (Global comparative statics of AI).
Let the competitive equilibrium be implicitly defined by , where , , and is nonsingular. Assume , so that AI capital is Edgeworth-complementary to both labor and physical capital ( and ). Then the equilibrium mapping is , with
and, provided full income rises with AI (),
while the fertility response is determined by the elasticity of full income relative to the wage,
so that if and only if full income rises less than proportionally to the wage. The sign pattern of is therefore for , with .
Proof.
Step 1: existence of the equilibrium mapping. Since and the Jacobian is nonsingular at the equilibrium solving , the implicit function theorem yields a unique map on a neighborhood of , with
Step 2: factor-price responses (technological channel). Differentiating the marginal products of the production function ,
under , with . Hence a larger AI stock raises the marginal products of labor and physical capital; by the labor-market and no-arbitrage conditions (Proposition 2.2), the equilibrium factor prices satisfy
the latter raising the gross return on saving and lowering the price of retirement consumption , .
Step 3: household block (closed form). Under logarithmic preferences the household solution is, with full income ,
Step 4: signs. Maintain (full income rises with AI: the wage gain of Step 2 and higher firm profits raise ). Then, since and are proportional to ,
For retirement consumption, with and (Step 2), so
Finally, , hence
so that
which is negative if and only if full income rises less than proportionally to the wage. Collecting the five signs gives the pattern for , with . ∎
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof.
Throughout, maintain the complementarity assumption , fix the physical capital stock , and let be the prevailing wage. Aggregate labor demand equates the wage to the marginal product of labor,
with . Writing ,
both bracket terms being negative (, ): the marginal product of labor is strictly decreasing in (strict concavity of output in labor). Moreover,
under (Edgeworth complementarity between labor and AI capital).
Conditional labor demand. Because on all of , is strictly decreasing and, together with and , the equation admits a unique global solution ; the implicit function theorem further makes it , with
so that, at a given wage, a larger AI stock shifts labor demand outward.
Equilibrium wage. Let labor-market clearing be , with , (the shift just established), and . Implicit differentiation gives
the denominator being strictly positive.
Rental of AI capital. For ,
(diminishing returns). Allowing labor to adjust, the total effect
is of ambiguous sign.
Consumption. Output is strictly increasing in AI capital, . By the resource constraint , whenever the induced rise in investment does not exceed that in output. ∎
A.5. Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof.
Limit technology. As , the CES aggregator converges to a linear one, , so
The marginal products are and , so the marginal rate of technical substitution is constant: labor and AI capital are perfect substitutes.
Conditional labor demand. At a given wage , the labor-demand condition reads , hence is constant in . Differentiating gives , i.e.
one efficiency unit of AI capital displaces units of labor.
Equilibrium wage. Let labor-market clearing be , with , , and . Implicit differentiation yields
the denominator being strictly positive and the numerator nonpositive (with equality only for perfectly elastic labor supply).
Rental of AI capital. Since , competitive pricing gives , whence
being a perfect substitute for labor, AI capital depresses the marginal product of the composite input and therefore its own rental, which falls together with the wage.
Consumption. Total output satisfies , with in equilibrium, so . By the resource constraint , the sign of is ambiguous, reflecting the opposing scale (output) and substitution (labor-income) effects.
Remark on determinacy. At exactly the nest is linear and interior factor demands exist only on the price ray ; the statics above are therefore understood as the limit . ∎
A.6. Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof.
Write the labor–AI composite as and , so that . The inner aggregator is homogeneous of degree one, with and ; write .
Marginal product of labor. Differentiating and using the chain rule,
Cross partial. Since , the sign of equals the sign of . Taking logarithms,
With , so that where ,
Because , and using together with ,
the last equality substituting and . Hence AI capital is an Edgeworth complement to labor if and only if , i.e. . In the Cobb–Douglas limit () the value share is constant at and the condition reduces to , the threshold of Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.1. ∎
A.7. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof.
Write , so that and , with . Up to the common markup , which cancels in every elasticity, the competitive factor prices are
Fix and . Since enters , , and only through , and additionally through the explicit factor in , logarithmic differentiation with gives
| (A.2) | ||||
| (A.3) | ||||
| (A.4) |
For the labor share, Euler’s theorem together with the wage expression yields . The AI share satisfies , so that ; hence
| (A.5) |
Equations (A.2)–(A.5) are the four claimed elasticities. The sign statements of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 follow because and .
A.8. Parenting time, fertility, and effective labor
Lemma A.1 (Parenting time, fertility, and effective labor).
Let preferences be with , strictly increasing and quasi-concave, , and let denote full income. The household’s optimal fertility is a function of the price of a child and of , and effective labor supply is . Define the own-price elasticity of fertility demand
Then parenting time and effective labor respond to the time cost according to
and, at given output and factor prices, the time cost of children affects factor demands only through ,
In particular, the labor-scarcity effect vanishes () if and only if fertility demand is unit-elastic, ; it is negative when demand is inelastic () and positive when demand is elastic (). The logarithmic specification is the knife-edge case .
Proof.
Standing assumptions. Let and satisfy , , the Hessian negative definite, and , so that the objective is strictly concave on . Assume the Inada conditions , ruling out boundary optima. Fix with and .
Step 1 (existence, uniqueness, interiority). For each the budget set is compact and convex with nonempty interior. As is continuous and strictly concave, it attains a unique maximizer on ; by the Inada conditions the maximizer lies in and the budget binds. Hence the optimum is the unique interior point satisfying the first-order conditions, for some multiplier :
| (A.6) |
together with .
Step 2 ( dependence on ). Define , with state and parameter , by
At the optimum . Its Jacobian in is the bordered Hessian
Strict concavity of (so that is negative definite) together with the nonzero constraint gradient implies, by the standard second-order theory of constrained optimization, that is negative definite on ; equivalently the bordered Hessian is nonsingular. Since , the implicit function theorem yields a neighborhood of on which the solution is the unique zero of and is continuously differentiable, with
| (A.7) |
In particular exists and is finite, and the own-price elasticity of fertility demand is well defined.
Step 3 (parenting time and effective labor). Let denote parenting time per worker. By Step 2, is and
Effective labor supply per worker is , whence , and aggregate effective labor ( predetermined) satisfies .
Step 4 (transmission to factor demands). At given output and factor prices , the firm’s conditional factor demands solve , where is, for , and concave with . The cost function is therefore and, by Shephard’s lemma, the conditional demands and are in the labor input . Because enters the firm’s program only through , the maps and are compositions of functions, and the chain rule gives
Step 5 (the unit-elastic knife edge). Since , the common factor vanishes if and only if , in which case and the time cost of children has no first-order labor-scarcity effect on factor demands. Otherwise the sign of each response is that of (): for inelastic fertility demand () the labor input falls with , while for elastic demand () it rises. The logarithmic specification delivers , the knife-edge case in which , , and the factor demands are all invariant to . This establishes the lemma. ∎
A.9. AI and economic growth: a two-capital decomposition
Proposition A.4 (AI and economic growth: a two-capital decomposition).
Let denote the aggregate capital stock, with the two stocks evolving as and , , and (goods-market clearing). Define the growth rate . Under competitive factor markets and an interior equilibrium, the effect of AI capital on growth admits the exact decomposition
The marginal product of AI capital is strictly positive and, under monopolistic competition, equals its rental scaled by the inverse markup, , where , for every . By Proposition 2.2 (Edgeworth complementarity together with an interior investment share), the equilibrium responses satisfy and . Terms (i)–(iv) thus have signs , and is of indeterminate sign in general. It is strictly positive if and only if the productivity gain exceeds the combined crowding-out and dilution effects,
or, equivalently, .
Proof.
Throughout, the equilibrium objects are treated as functions of on an open neighborhood of the interior equilibrium, with , so that all partial derivatives below exist and the quotient rule applies.
Step 1 (marginal product and rental). With and ,
Under monopolistic competition the firm equates the rental to the marginal revenue product, with , so .
Step 2 (variation of next-period capital). Summing the two laws of motion, , and differentiating with respect to gives, by linearity and using ,
| (A.8) |
By Proposition 2.2, and .
Step 3 (growth decomposition). By the quotient rule applied to ,
| (A.9) |
Substituting (A.8) into (A.9) and grouping, with ,
yields the decomposition
| (A.10) |
Under the sign restrictions of Step 2 and , the four terms of (A.10) have signs , so is not sign-definite. Multiplying (A.10) by gives
Step 4 (logarithmic form). Dividing (A.9) by preserves the sign and gives
so , which completes the proof. ∎
A.10. Proof of Proposition 6.2
Proof.
At an interior equilibrium the capital market clears,
where is aggregate capital demand and collects the preference parameters. By the firms’ first-order conditions and the strict concavity of the production nest, capital demand is strictly decreasing in the return, , while desired saving has a nonnegative slope, (for logarithmic preferences is independent of ). Implicit differentiation of the clearing condition gives
with strictly positive denominator. A positive AI shock raises the marginal products of both stocks (Proposition 2.2 and the Remark following Proposition 2.1), so and . A positive longevity shock raises desired saving, (Proposition A.1), so the second numerator is negative and . The parameters enter only and the level of , hence the magnitude of the responses but not their sign. ∎
A.11. Derivation of the consumption-equivalent measure (Definition 5.1)
Proof.
Consider the cohort that is young at date , whose equilibrium welfare is
The consumption-equivalent variation is defined as the permanent proportional change in lifetime consumption that, applied uniformly to the two consumption goods entering felicity, and , reproduces a given welfare change . Fertility is a time-allocation choice rather than a consumption good, and is therefore held fixed in the experiment. Replacing by and by gives the scaled welfare level
Applying to the first and third terms and collecting the contributions,
since the scalar factors out of both the worker term and the survival-weighted retiree term, while the fertility term is unaffected. By definition equates the welfare gain from this scaling to the perturbation :
Solving for ,
which is the expression stated in Definition 5.1. Two observations clarify its content. First, the coefficient is exactly the sum of the weights attached to the log-consumption terms in , namely unity on the worker term and on the retiree term; a permanent uniform rise in both consumptions therefore raises welfare in proportion to this total weight. Second, a first-order expansion around gives , so inherits the sign of and the denominator merely converts the utils into consumption-equivalent units. ∎
A.12. Envelope representation of marginal welfare
Lemma A.2 (Envelope representation of marginal welfare).
Let be the multiplier on the household’s consolidated budget constraint , and write . Evaluating at the optimal policy, the partial effects of the household’s environment on welfare are
| (A.11) | ||||
| (A.12) | ||||
| (A.13) | ||||
| (A.14) |
Proof.
The household chooses to maximize subject to , with . With multiplier and Lagrangian , the objective is strictly concave and the constraint linear, so the interior first-order conditions
characterize the unique optimum, with . Let denote the optimized value. The envelope theorem yields, for each , at the optimum:
Positivity of follows from . ∎
A.13. Proof of Proposition 5.1
A.14. Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof.
(a) For , , so the longevity channel vanishes. By Propositions A.3 and 2.2 (complementarity) and , and by Proposition 6.2 . The coefficients are all strictly positive, so every surviving term in Proposition 5.1 is positive and . (b) For the longevity shock , and the longevity channel contributes . Capital deepening raises the wage, , while (Proposition 6.2). Placing the positive terms (value of a longer life and the wage gain) and the negative terms (financing cost, return compression, net of any dividend change) on opposite sides of Proposition 5.1 gives the stated necessary-and-sufficient condition; the sign is not determined by theory alone. ∎
A.15. Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof.
On a balanced path aggregate capital and output grow at the gross rate of the working-age population, ; the modified golden-rule (Cass–Diamond) comparison is therefore between and , and the equilibrium is dynamically efficient iff (Diamond, 1965). Linearity of the margin gives . For , (Proposition 6.2) and (Proposition A.3); the difference is positive iff . For , (Proposition 6.2) and (Proposition A.2); the difference of two negative numbers is of ambiguous sign. In both cases the saving-supply force lowers toward , which establishes the claim. ∎
Appendix B Additional robustness exercises
This appendix reports two further sensitivity exercises complementing the analysis of Section 6: variation of the physical-capital share (Appendix B.1) and of the persistence of the AI shock (Appendix B.2). Both figures follow the conventions of Figure 6.1.
B.1. The physical-capital share
The capital share jointly governs the steady-state factor income distribution and, together with , the location of the complementarity threshold . We sweep , covering the conventional range of estimates for advanced economies.
The wage and fertility responses (Figure B.1) remain positive at impact across the entire grid: with held at its baseline and the threshold exceeding 2 everywhere on the grid, the economy remains in the complementarity regime. A lower , corresponding to a larger labor share, amplifies the wage and fertility responses, because the AI-induced productivity gain passes through more strongly to labor when labor weighs more heavily in production; a higher dampens them, and at the upper end of the grid the wage response turns marginally negative at longer horizons. Output is likewise decreasing in at impact, reflecting the smaller labor base through which the AI-induced productivity gain is amplified; the rental of AI capital is mildly decreasing in because physical capital captures a larger share of that gain. None of these comparative-static patterns alters the qualitative conclusions: the results are insensitive to plausible variation in the capital share.
B.2. The persistence of the AI shock
The persistence parameter controls the half-life of the productivity impulse. We sweep , spanning short-lived to highly persistent disturbances.
Persistence governs magnitudes and the speed of decay, not signs (Figure B.2). More persistent shocks generate larger and longer-lived responses of wages, fertility, output, and consumption, because a more durable productivity gain elicits a larger permanent-income response and a stronger investment reaction. The impact jump in the AI rental is essentially invariant to , since it is governed by the size of the shock rather than its persistence, whereas the peak response of the physical-capital rental rises with as the more durable impulse sustains a larger investment boom. As , the responses approach those of a permanent technology shift, with wages and fertility settling at elevated levels for an extended horizon. The qualitative profile, hump-shaped output and wage paths, a sharp impact response of , and a mild positive fertility response, is robust across the entire grid.
Appendix C Tables
This appendix collects the second-order statistics.
| Variable | Mean | Std. dev. | ||
| 0.4313 | 0.0045 | 0.96 | 1.00 | |
| 0.2705 | 0.0028 | 0.91 | 0.94 | |
| 0.1385 | 0.0029 | 0.93 | 0.96 | |
| 0.1319 | 0.0004 | 0.65 | -0.32 | |
| 0.1178 | 0.0024 | 0.93 | 0.97 | |
| 0.0837 | 0.0014 | 0.98 | 0.97 | |
| 0.0341 | 0.0007 | 0.98 | 0.98 | |
| 0.0904 | 0.0006 | 0.99 | 0.93 | |
| 0.0382 | 0.0005 | 0.99 | 0.92 | |
| 2.4498 | 0.0151 | 0.88 | -0.78 | |
| 1.0000 | 0.0038 | 0.73 | 0.50 | |
| 1.0000 | 0.0067 | 0.80 | 0.63 | |
| 0.4650 | 0.0141 | 0.93 | 0.95 | |
| 0.6103 | 0.0024 | 0.90 | 0.92 | |
| 2.0000 | 0.0125 | 0.90 | -0.92 | |
| 0.3386 | 0.0016 | 0.98 | 0.98 | |
| 1.5298 | 0.0104 | 0.97 | -0.79 | |
| 1.5698 | 0.0133 | 0.85 | -0.27 |
| Variable | (AI) | |
| 4.21 | 95.79 | |
| 1.88 | 98.12 | |
| 1.21 | 98.79 | |
| 4.28 | 95.72 | |
| 0.10 | 99.90 | |
| 0.32 | 99.68 | |
| 2.06 | 97.94 | |
| 1.06 | 98.94 | |
| 7.53 | 92.47 | |
| 9.31 | 90.69 | |
| 0.84 | 99.16 | |
| 18.49 | 81.51 | |
| 0.00 | 100.00 | |
| 0.10 | 99.90 | |
| 0.10 | 99.90 | |
| 0.85 | 99.15 | |
| 18.76 | 81.24 | |
| 75.48 | 24.52 |
| 1.00 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 0.94 | 1.00 | |||||||||||||||||
| 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.00 | ||||||||||||||||
| -0.32 | -0.10 | -0.24 | 1.00 | |||||||||||||||
| 0.97 | 0.87 | 0.93 | -0.53 | 1.00 | ||||||||||||||
| 0.97 | 0.94 | 0.96 | -0.34 | 0.97 | 1.00 | |||||||||||||
| 0.98 | 0.95 | 0.96 | -0.21 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 1.00 | ||||||||||||
| 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.93 | -0.16 | 0.90 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 1.00 | |||||||||||
| 0.92 | 0.91 | 0.89 | -0.01 | 0.82 | 0.88 | 0.97 | 0.92 | 1.00 | ||||||||||
| -0.78 | -0.68 | -0.77 | 0.74 | -0.92 | -0.86 | -0.75 | -0.76 | -0.56 | 1.00 | |||||||||
| 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.43 | -0.97 | 0.68 | 0.50 | 0.38 | 0.31 | 0.18 | -0.82 | 1.00 | ||||||||
| 0.63 | 0.44 | 0.53 | -0.74 | 0.70 | 0.54 | 0.45 | 0.36 | 0.30 | -0.67 | 0.84 | 1.00 | |||||||
| 0.95 | 0.86 | 0.92 | -0.58 | 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.77 | -0.94 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 1.00 | ||||||
| 0.92 | 0.81 | 0.88 | -0.65 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.73 | -0.95 | 0.77 | 0.74 | 0.99 | 1.00 | |||||
| -0.92 | -0.81 | -0.88 | 0.65 | -0.99 | -0.93 | -0.87 | -0.84 | -0.73 | 0.95 | -0.77 | -0.74 | -0.99 | -1.00 | 1.00 | ||||
| 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.97 | -0.20 | 0.93 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.94 | -0.76 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.91 | 0.88 | -0.88 | 1.00 | |||
| -0.79 | -0.81 | -0.84 | 0.32 | -0.84 | -0.92 | -0.83 | -0.92 | -0.70 | 0.87 | -0.43 | -0.32 | -0.85 | -0.83 | 0.83 | -0.86 | 1.00 | ||
| -0.27 | -0.34 | -0.36 | 0.19 | -0.38 | -0.48 | -0.41 | -0.53 | -0.32 | 0.57 | -0.16 | 0.23 | -0.39 | -0.40 | 0.40 | -0.39 | 0.75 | 1.00 |